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Abstract: Currency and financial crises are determinants of growth and development, mainly in 
developing countries subject to shocks, contagion and volatility. A relevant issue when trying to do 
the implementation of development policies is to anticipate or forecast the occurrence of currency 
crises that could turn good ideas into failure. This type of crises have strong negative economic, social 
and political consequences. This paper takes a look in the leading indicators literature and shows that 
this approach failed in predicting the Argentinean collapse of 2001-2002.  We also show that particular 
features of the Argentinean economy needed of different indicators to forecast the collapse of the 
currency board system. The paper also developes some new indicators to include in an Early Warning 
System that can take on account specific features of Argentina´s economy. This indicators developed 
can be integrated into a wider set in order to be a useful tool for policymakers and authorities in 
Argentina and in other developing countries in the planification and implementation of development 
policies and programs.     1
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1- Introduction 
Growth plays a key role for development in the economy of every country, specially in developing 
ones where another key issue is that of the vulnerability of their economies. As is is usually said, there 
can be growth without development but not development without growth. Economic activity in less 
developed countries is subject to shocks (internal or external) that frequently end in crises. The main 
crises being those related to the financial sector and currency crises that soon spill into the rest of the 
economy. In most of the cases emergency policies are implemented as a reaction to the problems that 
arise from the crisis. Sometimes this actions taken by the economic authorities lead to a deepening of 
the crisis, to a decline in economic activity or to volatily in the production. An example of this types of 
actions are rises in tax rates and cutting of expenditures (mainly public investment and social 
expenditures). As a consequence poverty and unemployment rise, with all the social and political 
consequences that this increase has. An important issue regards to at which extent crises can be 
reverted by appropriate policies implemented by the government or other key actors. From this 
central issue arises the question about the probability of predicting  this type of crisis and which 
variables could signal with enough anticipation the developing of this crises. There are plenty of 
problems and difficulties in the forecasting of currency crises: some of them related to the availability 
of appropriate data, some related to the volatility of indicators and some related to the heterogeneity 
of crises between countries which makes imposible to extrapolate the crisis experience in one country 
to explain other country experience. 
A currency crisis can be defined in the context of a flexible exchange rate regime as a sharp change or 
correction in the nominal exchange rate. In the context of a fixed exchange rate regime it can be 
defined as a sharp change in international reserves due to the government defense of the nominal 
exchange rate or also as the abandonment of the peg.  As the IMF (1999) points out, currency crises are 
cosly, specially regarding the effect on economic activity through the misallocation or subutilization of 
resources that lead sometimes to output falls. Near 60% of currency crises have ended in output 
losses. As can be seen in Table 1 the average recovery time for a currency crisis is 1,6 years and the 
average autput loss is 4,3%. It is also evident here the diference between industrial countries where 
the average loss is 3,1% and the emerging markets where is 4,8%. If a currency crisis occurs 
simultaneously with a banking crash the situacion is even worse with verage output losses of 14,4% 
  
Table 1: Costs of Crisis in Lost Output relative to Trend 
  Number of 
Crises 
Average Recovery 
Time (in years) 
Cumulative Loss of 
Output per Crisis 
Cunmulative Loss of Outpout 
per Crisis with Output Loss 
Currency Crises  158  1.6  4.3  7.1 
Industrial Countries  42 1.9  3.1  5.6 
Emerging Markets  116 1.5  4.8  7.6 
Currency Crashes  55  2.0  7.1  10.1 
Industrial Countries  13 2.1  5  8 
Emerging Markets  42 1.9  7.9  10.7 
Banking Crashes  54  3.1  11.6  14.2 
Industrial Countries  12 4.1  10.2  15.2 
Emerging Markets  42 2.8  12.1  14 
Source: IMF – World Economic Outlook – May 1999.    2
 
Many factors and variables have been studied in order to explain accurately, with different degrees of 
success, this type of currency crises: exchange rate factors, political factors, financial sector factors, 
external conditions, mecroeconomic policies. Some of this indicators succeeded in explaining currency 
crises as the ones in the 1970s, others explained crises like the ones in the early 1990s. The literature on 
currency crises got a boost after the Mexican and, fundamentally, the Asian crises. But there were a 
number of crises that could not be explained from just one of this point of view, not to say they could 
not be forecasted with enough anticipation. 
A currency crisis that was not accurately forecasted was the one suffered by Argentina between 2001-
20021. There have been many explanations about the causes and consequences of Argentina´s crisis. 
Most of them are based on the observation of the evolution of key economic variables. Fiscal, 
monetary, financial variables have been analized in order to give an explanation. Nevertheless, most 
of this explanations were given post crisis and literature did not give a set of indicators that could 
have been taken on account in order to anticipate the crisis. The indicators were not clear in 
preanuncing with enough anticipation the occurrence of this crisis that ended in a hard devaluation of 
the local currency that soon translated into an increase in prices. The particularities of the Argentinean 
economy made  indicators such as the ones in Kaminsky et al. (1997) or Kaminsky (1999) fail in giving 
a good prediction of the 2001-2002 crisis despite being good early warning systems of crises for other 
countries episodes. 
The goal of an Early Warning Systems (EWS) of currency crisis is to predict the possibility of a crisis in 
a given country. In countries with weak fundamentals, this can be easily done just by watching the 
evolution of certain key macroeconomic or financial variables. In that situation, the question is not if 
the crisis will occur or not, but when will it happen. And the main policy goal will be to anticipate 
t h e m .  T h e  m a i n  o b j e c t i v e  o f  a n  E W S  t h e n  s h o u l d  b e  t o  g i v e  e n o u g h  c r i s i s  s i g n a l s  w i t h  e n o u g h  
anticipation to allow the policymakers to react to them and try to avoid this approaching crisis. 
In our analysis of Argentina´s crisis we have chosen to work mostly with monthly data because 
quarterly official data often has a three month lag in its publication (and also some lag on its 
elaboration). It is more useful as a policy tool to work with monthly data which is available almost 
inmediately with a fifteen/twenty days lag in the worst cases. The use of monthly data gives the 
policymaker a faster knowledge of the proximity of a crisis and a faster reaction capacity when the 
indicators start sending signals. We have also used quarterly data in the case of some essential 
external variables (Balance of Payments, Private Capital flows variations) which are only available 
with this periodicity 
Also we have chosen to include pre and post crisis data in order to have a longer serie and to see the 
reaction of the variables and indicators in the aftermath of the crisis. 
This paper is organized as follows: In section 2 we will give a brief overview of Argentina´s crisis, in 
section 3 we will explain the methodology used by authors like Kaminsky and Reinhardt to establish 
leading indicators systems as an early warning. In section 4 we will evaluate some of this indicators 
for Argentina showing that most of them failed to send crises signals with enough anticipation and, 
finally, in section 5 we propose some new indicators that could have signaled the 2001-2002 crisis. 
 
                                                      
1 Years 2001 and 2002 are the date of the crisis climax but output had already become stagnant in mid 1998. In all, 
Argentina´s recession lasted 4 and a half years with a total output loss of almost 20%.     3
2- Argentina´s 2001-2002  Currency Crisis 
After two hyperinflationary episodes in 1989 and 1990 Argentina established on April 1991 a currency 
board system with a fixed exchange rate pegged to the U.S. dollar. This currency board system was 
sustained up to its collapse more than ten years later, in January 2002.  
Table 2: Argentina – Relevant economic indicators 1988 - 2002 
Indicator 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
GDP Growth (in %) -2.0 -7.0 -1.3 10.5 10.3 6.3 5.8 -2.8 5.5 8.1 3.9 -3.4 -0.8 -4.4 -10.9
Consumer Price Inflation (in%) 388 4924 1344 84.0 17.5 7.4 3.9 1.6 0.1 0.3 0.7 -1.8 -0.7 -1.5 41.0
Wholesale Price Inflation (in%) 374 5386 798 56.7 3.2 0.1 5.8 6.0 2.1 -0.9 -6.3 1.2 2.4 -5.3 118.2
GDP per habitant 4,047 2,565 4,345 5,751 6,845 6,983 7,501 7,421 7,727 8,210 8,277 7,751 7,675 7,184 2,681
Real Exchange Rate (1991=100) 262.7 354.9 162.2 99.61 85.13 76.41 79.55 86.69 91.32 90.08 82.74 75.07 76.31 77.19 184.7
Public Sector Fiscal Balance (as % of GDP) -7.93 -7.81 -4.73 -1.42 -0.45 -0.01 -1.67 -2.89 -3.16 -1.5 -2.42 -4.51 -3.3 -7.03 -0.81
Primary Public Sector Fiscal Balance (as % of GDP) -5.15 -3.66 -3.08 0.03 1.69 1.42 -0.17 -0.93 -1.24 0.8 -0.22 -1.11 0.76 -1.96 1.84  
 
Pegging the exchange rate to the dollar and backing up all monetary emission with international 
reserves nominated in dollars succeeded at first in reducing inflation. As can be seen in Table 2,  the 
Consumer Price Index that had an increase in 1990 of 1344% had a reduced growth in 1991 (84%) and 
1992 (17.5%). The same happened with the wholesale prices that in 1990 arose 798% and in 1991 
56.7%, being almost stabilized in 1992 (3.2%). Also, GDP that ahd fallen three consecutive years 
reverted to growth in 1991. The currency board was a useful tool to import price stability and also to 
give some credibility to the macroeconomic policy that the governement was originally going to 
follow. As we may see, this system also had its drawbacks, mainly its rigidity. 
 














































































































































Source: Central Bank of Argentina 
As can be seen in Figure 1, after setting the currency board the Real Exchange Rate experienced an 
appreciation against a basket of foreign currencies weighted by their participation in Argentina´s 
commerce (multilateral real exchange rate) from April 1991 reaching a first maximum in late 1993. 
This was consistent with a period of high growth and low inflation after the currency board was 
settled. Growth slowdown in 1994 and the Mexican crisis had its impact on the Real Exchange Rate 
causing a depreciation during 1994 and half of 1995. After this depreciation as a consequence of the 
Mexican crisis and its impact in Argentina, the real exchange rate started a new appreciation process 
following the dollar appreciation of 1995 – 1998. Two and a half consecutive years of growth (1996, 
1997 and the first half of 1998) also further appreciated the Argentinean real exchange rate.     4
A combination of external shocks, contagion and sudden stops in capital flows along with the 
incapacity of the peg to react to this shocks, a lack of monetary policy due to the currency board 
scheme and lax fiscal policies are among the causes that are always cited as paving the path for the 
2001-2002 crisis. The row of external shocks suffered by Argentina since 1997 were very important in 
explaining the depression that started in mid 1998. The devaluation of the Brazilian currency  in 
January 1999 was of crucial importance in the deepening of the crisis. Being Brazil the main trading 
partner of Argentina this devaluation led to a huge appreciation in the Argentinean multilateral real 
exchange rate, reaching the maximum since the instauration of the pegged system (Figure 1). The 
Brazilian devaluation had an impact mainly in Argentina´s industrial sector, in certain branches like 
the Automobile sector or the textile one that saw their competitivity eroded fastly. 
After the capital flows diminished critically in the beginning of 2001´s second half and due to the 
heavy appreciation of the U.S. Real Exchange Rate that was eroding Argentina´s competitivity with its 
main trading partners (fundamentally the devaluated Brazil that receives almost 30% of Argentina´s 
exports), the governement tried to face this circumstances creating a “widened convertibility” that 
was going to be fixed to a basket of U.S. Dollar and Euro. This system was going to be implemented 
when the nominal exchange rate of the Euro was going to be equal to one dollar. This was going to be 
similar to a depreciation of the real exchange rate close to 8%. The markets saw this change in the 
currency board scheme as a sign of devaluation and the reversal of capital flows deepened in the 
second semester. 
A diminishing quantity of capital flows where one of the main features in the collapse of the 
Argentinean currency. Capital flows diminished after all external shocks, being strongly reversed after 
the Mexican Crisis and starting a bigger reversal in mid 2001. Debt markets were closed for Argentina 
in mid 2001 and that accelerated the collapse. 
 
Figure 2: Argentina - Capital Account 1992-2004 




































































































































































                    Source: Ministry of Economy   
As can be seen on Figure 2 the overall capital account had a strong reversal only in the second half of 
2001 but it had started to become stagnnt in mid 1999 when positive capital inflows started to lower 
their magnitude. This is more evident while looking to Figure 2-b) that shows the evolution of Private    5
Sector Capitals. Here is evident the impact that the successive crises had on the capital flow to 
Argentina. 
 
The fiscal policy 
In the first years after the setting of the pegged exchange rate Argentina´s fiscal deficit was reduced 
through an increase in tax revenues due to the price stabilization scheme, through privatization of 
public enterprises (that had a double role of reducing expenditures and increasing capital revenues in 
the governmentàs balance sheet). This lead to an almost equilibrated fiscal primary balance2 (without 
taking on account the payment of debt interests) and a small primary surplus in 1992 and 1993 
 















































































































Source: Ministry of Economy 
 
In 1994 part of the social security system was privatized taking a source of revenues for the public 
sector. This had to be partially compensated with some tax reforms (raising the VAT rate, for 
example). But growing expenditures, specially in electoral years and increasing interest debt 
payments eroded the public sector balance. As can be seen in Figure 3, in the late nineties interest 
payments grew considerably and this is evident in the diference between the primary and overall 
balances line.  
Public sector´s deficit that in the seventies and eighties were financed through monetary emision and 
in the nineties through privatization of public enterprises and mainly through debt emission faced a 
lack of instruments to be financed when capital flows reverted. The government that assumed in late 
1999 tried to downsize the fiscal deficit  with a big tax reform but that was clearly not enough and at 
the same time had a big impact on activity, stopping a possible reactivation. In July 2001 the 
government created a “zero deficit” law that was subsequently violated in October 2001 (in less than 
three months).  After that, came the collapse 
 
                                                      
2 It is noticeable that Argentina only had an overall fiscal surplus in 2003, mostly due to lower interest payments 
derived from the defaulting of a big part of the public debt.    6
 
The financial sector 
One of the main reasons of the December 2001 government resignation was the banking crisis that 
Argentina was facing in late 2001. This crisis lead to a heavy reduction through withdrawal in bank 
deposits and on November 30th the government issued a decree by which clients could not withdraw 
more than 250 pesos (still equivalent to 250 dollars) per week (“corralito bancario”). This led to public 
demonstrations that finally ended in the resignation of the authorities. 













Source: Central Bank of Argentina 
The reduction of deposits that led to this political crisis was not a new thing for Argentina. In the past 
many times the country had suffered from bank runs and financial crisis (the 1977 and 1989 ones 
being the most studied ones) . At the same time, after the hyperinflationary process of the late eighties 
there was no confidence on local currency. A variable that can be analized with easiness is the degree 
of dollarization in the Argentinean banking system: the proportion of dollarized credits and deposits 
shows that after establishing the currency board the foreign currency that functioned as an anchor for 
prices3 (the dollar) started replacing the domestic currency for financial operations. As can be seen in 
Figure 4 in 1996 deposits and credits in dollars represented over 50% of the overall deposits and 
credits. As external shocks hit the domestic economy this proportion started to grow reaching almost 
70% of the total.                                       
After the collapse of the currency board, deposits and credits were turned into local currency in what 
was called “assimetric pesification”. Deposits were turneds into pesos and adjusted by inflation and 
credits were also converted and adjusted by a wages index. The problem was that dollarized deposits 
had to be returned to clients at current exchange rate (that was close to 3 pesos per dollar) and credits 
had to be adjusted at a rate of 1,40 pesos per dollar. This led to a big ammount of central bank help to 
banks through 2002 because of the dislocation in the banks balance sheets produced by this assimetric 
procedure. Banking system only started recovering in late 2003. 
 
                                                      
3 It is always said that Argetina “imported price stability from the U.S.A. by implementing the currency board 
scheme”.    7
The crisis aftermath 
After the collapse of the currency board regime Argentina went directly into the deepening of the 
worst recession in its history with a fall in GDP of 10,9% (in the first quarter of 2002 the fall in GDP 
was close to 20%). Heavy interest payments that impacted in the past in the fiscal results were 
diminished by declaring an unilateral default on private debt. 
Inflation rose to almost 80% annual (average consumer and wholesale prices index) increasing 
poverty in a dramatic way. Almost 50% of the population where considered poor in the May 2002 
survey done by the National Statistics Office (INDEC). Almost 25% of the population was considered 
living in conditions of extreme poverty.  
Public sector mantained their expenditures low in real terms while tax revenues increased thanks to 
the effect of inflation in the VAT and the introduction of an export tax that has become a fundamental 
part of the tax system since then. This, along with the recovery on activity, lead to a surplus in 2003 
and 2004. Needless to say that the magnitude of the crisis made impossible to generate any kind of 
development policy. 
It remains a big question if this consequences could have been avoided if a signals system had been 
developed correctly. 
 
Theoretical models of currency crisis 
To explain the causes that turn into a currency crisis the literature has developed at least three types of 
models. The first generation models, derived from works like the one by Krugman (1979) , show that 
the crisis in the local currency arises from the exhausting of international reserves when facing 
speculative attacks. This speculative attacks where generated by the perception that the local 
governement is pursuing fiscal and monetary policies that are not coherent with the fixed exchange 
rate that the country is trying to maintain. This models were useful to explain the currencies crisis 
suffered by Latin American countries in the seventies. 
A basic framework of this type of models, that can be empirically evaluated could be (all the variables 
are in logarithms): 
0, 1, .( ) tt t t t mp i α α −= +            ( 2 . 1 )  
tt t mcr =+              ( 2 . 2 )  
*
tt t p pe =+              ( 2 . 3 )  
*
tt t ii e =+ ∆              ( 2 . 4 )  
where  t p  is the domestic price level,
*
t p  is the external price level,  t e is the nominal exchange rate, 
t m is domestic money supply,  t c  is domestic credit,  t r  are international reserves in domestic country, 
t i is the domestic interest rate, 
*
t i is the international interest rate and the  , it α are positive coefficients. 
Equation (2.1) and (2.2) determine the money market equilibrium, equation (2.3) is simply Purchasing 
Power Parity and equation (2.4) is interest rate parity. 
Just replacing the last three equations into (2.1): 
**
0, 1, () . ( ) tt t t t t t t cr pe i e αα +− + = − + ∆         ( 2 . 5 )  
If the government comits to a fixed exchange rate or a peg, then equation (5) is reduced to     8
**
0, 1, . tt t t t t crpe i αα +− −= −            ( 2 . 5 ´ )  
If all the international variables are exogenous, then 
** 0 tt pi = =  
0, tt t creα +−=      or      0, tt t cr e α + =+        (2.5´´) 
This equation shows that if the nominal exchange rate is constant, the whole right side of the equation  
must be constant too. An increase in domestic credit must be offset by a decrease in international 
reserves. The inconsistency of monetary policies leads to a loss of international reserves due to to the 
defense of the fixed exchange rate. An example of this credit expansion could be the monetarization of 
fical deficits. Eventually, the fixed exchange rate regime is abandoned when reserves reach a critical 
low limit. 
Some factors like persistent loss of international reserves, expansionary fiscal policies with persistent 
deficits, appreciation of the real exchange rate, current account deficits might be signals of a currency 
crisis in this type of models. 
 
The second generation models, derived from studies like the one by Obstfeld (1986) focus their 
attention on the role of expectations. In this type of models domestic interest rates have an important 
role in explaining the development of crises. When trying to stop a speculative attack (even when 
there are no problems in the macroeconomic fundamentals) the policy followed by the authorities 
must be to raise the interest rates. The authorities may decide to abandon the fixed exchange rate if 
they think that the possible effects of measure taken to sustain it could have a negative effect on other 
economic variables that are of key importance for the authorities. Under certain circumstances the 
benefits of mantaining the peg are surpassed by its costs. 
In this type of models the government has an optimizing behavior traying to minimize a social loss 





e wd d z
Ld
ε −− −
=+           ( 2 . 6 )  
where  d  is rate of depreciation of the domestic currency,
e d  is the expected rate of depreciation of 
the domestic currency price level, z is a shock with mean equal to zero and variance equal to 
2 σ  and 
s is a measure of distortion. 
On this models the crisis can be self fulfilled because of the existence of multiple equilibriums that 
have implicit a trade-off between mantaining the fixed exchange rate and other goals that the 
government could find as important. It is possible also that the crisis is just a jump from the fixed 
exchange rate equilibrium to the floating exchange rate one.  
This models were helpful to explain the early nineties currency crises of some European countries that 
had strong fundamentals. Some indicators that are used in this type of models are: unemployment 
rate growth, public debt excessive growth, output volatility and increase in interest rates. 
 
A third generation of models where developed after the crisis in the East Asian countries in 1997. In 
July 1997 the Thailand devaluation triggered a row of currency crises in countries like Malaysia, 
Indonesia, Singapore and Korea. The Asian crisis had spillovers even in distant countries like Russia 
and Brazil. As most of the macroeconomic variables were solid enough in the Asian countries, this 
crisis took everybody by surprise. One of the explanations given to this phenomenon was the strong    9
financial linkage that exists between the East Asian economies. Rapid movements in international 
capital flows and financial and banking weaknesses unleashed the crisis.  
The third generation models focus on domestic financial system frailty as one of the major causes in 
the currency crisis.  Financial sector problems may lead to or generate a currency crisis. Some key 
variables in this type of models are: government bailouts to the banking sector, maturity of debt, 
currency in which is nominated the public debt (local currency versus foreign currncy). Into this 
group of models we can count the ones that consider contagion between countries. 
Some countries may suffer of contagion despite having solid fundamentals and this is enough to 
trigger a currency crisis. That is why much attention has been paid by international financial 
organizations to this problem in recent crises like the Mexican in 1994-1995 and the European 
Monetary System in 1992-1993. This lead to heavy intervention by this organizations to avoid the 
spreading of the crisis.  
There are plenty of channels through which this type of crisis can spread. One of this channels is the 
loss of competitiveness that will suffer the country that is being affected by the contagion phenomena. 
If a country currency collapses after a crisis, the contagion effect on other country could be the loss of 
competitiveness of the later through the relative increase of the price of its exports (in comparison to 
the country that devaluated its currency). Also, there is a second channel for contagion: financial links 
among countries. In this case, a crisis in one country can make investors manage their risk and balance 
their portfolios against other countries or even against a region. 
A third channel in which contagion can be spread is through external trade. The country that has 
suffered a collapse of its currency will decrease fast enough its imports due to the sudden increase in 
its prices and also through the decrease in income. This has a direct effect on the trade partners of the 
country that started the contagion. The size of international trade among the countries is fundamental 
to see the magnitude of the contagion effect. 
Authors like Masson (1998) classify contagion crises in therre types: moonsoonal effects, spillovers 
and pure contagion. In the first type the shocks in developing countries have a close relationship with 
economic shifts in developed countries. The second type are the sort of crisis that spill from one 
country to others. Pure contagion is the type of contagion crisis that occurs simultaneously in several 
countries. This later crises are linked to self-fulfilling behavior or self-fulfilling speculative attacks. 
Investors may perceive that fundamentals have a high risk of collapsing and they will take all their 
assets out of the market, unleashing a crisis. That is what happened in the 1998 Russian crisis that 
spilled over to East European Countris and Latin America. 
Indicators used to study contagion crises are, comng others: a reduction in commodity prices, growth 
of international real interest rates and reduction of world aggregate demand. 
Nevertheless, a fundamental issue that concerns many economists is the related to generate a system 
of variables that can predict a currency crisis. Specially the choice of indicators that can forecast the 
crisis with enough anticipation. 
 
3- Leading Indicators as an early warning system 
There have been many studies about leading indicators of currency crises, some of them based on 
logit or probit models, which show, based in multiple variables, if the crisis will occur or not, and 
others based in multiple indicators called Early Warning Systems (EWS). This approach is based in 
considering certain variables from the three theoretical models considered on the previous section.    10
The leading indicators presented in works like the ones by Kaminsky et al. (1997) and Kaminsky-
Reinhart (1999) focus on a group of monetary, financial, fiscal and macroeconomic variables that when 
a currency crisis is approaching issue signals that can be helpful to anticipate them. 
T o  d e f i n e  t h e  m o m e n t  i n  w h i c h  a  c r i s i s  i s  d e v e l o p i n g  K a m i n s k y  e l a b o r a t e s  a n  E x c h a n g e  M a r k e t  
Pressure Index (EMP), constructed as a weighted average between monthly variations in real 
exchange rate ( t RER ∆ ) and monthly changes in international reserves.( Re t s ∆ ).  
The index has the form: 
1, 1 2 Re ttt Iw R E R w s =∆ −∆            ( 3 . 1 )  


































where  1 w  and  2 w  are the weights for each variable. The weights are calculated making the 
condicional variance of both indicators equal.  Then, thresholds that signal the moment of the crisis 
are fixed (in the case of the ones developed in Kaminsky (1998) the value of the threshold is equal to 
three standard deviations over the mean of the index).  
Authors like Eichengreen et al. (1994 ) also include as a fundamental variable in this EMP index the 
interest rate because it is another policy instrument that can be used to defend the local currency. 
When facing a speculative attack to the peg or fixed exchange rate system the government has at least 
three options to react: a) it can defend the local currency by doing exchange market operations with 
international reserves, b) it can abandon the fixed exchange rate system and let the rate float, c) it can 
raise interest rates in order to stop capital reversals. In the case that this three variables are used we 
can set an indicator of this type: 
2, 1 2 3 Re tt tt I w RER w i w s =∆ +∆ −∆           ( 3 . 2 )  
where   () 1 − − = ∆ t t t i i i  
Each time the index crosses a threshold it issues a crisis signal.  A currency crisis can be defined either 
if a sharp depreciation of the local currency occurs or if there exists a sharp decrease in international 
reserves used to sustain a fixed exchange rate. Frankel and Rose (1996) have defined, somewhat 
aribtrarely, a currency crisis as a depreciation of the local currency of at least 25% in a year. As the 
authors remark, this is an arbitrary value for this movement in exchange rate. 
Then, some variables or indicators must be chosen and analyzed in a similar way. Thresholds on each 
of this indicators are established in order to see when they will issue a crisis signal. 
This signals that this indicators issue must anticipate or be inside a “crisis window” (established as 12 
or 24 months before the EMP index issues the crisis signals). With less anticipation the policymaker 
may not have enough time to “correct the wrong signals” . A matrix like the following can be 
developed in order to evaluate the accuracy of each of the indicators: 
Table 3: Accuracy of the indicators 
 Crisis  No  Crisis 
Indicator issues signal (12 or 24 
months before crisis signals) 
A B 
Indicator does not issue a signal  C  D 
    11
Kaminsky uses a “noise to signal ratio” to determine which is the optimal threshold for each indicator. 
She also creates some composite indicators in order to classify the signals according to their strength; 
in order to consider the deterioration of the fundamentals in the considered country and in order to 
compare the accuracy of the signals as crises predictors. One of the major drawbacks of this approach 
is that the threshold values are somewhat arbitrary (as the weights of the EMP index are) both in the 
case of the EMP index and also in the case of the indicators. 
Then, an index of “currency fragility” is calculated. This index is defined as the number of indicators 
sending signals for each month. A desirable property of this index is that it will increase with enough 
anticipation before a crisis erupts. As we will see this was not the case for Argentina. 
This “currency fragility” index is the first of the composite indicators. It simply sums the number of 
indicators that are making signals of crisis in a point of time: 
1, , ti t CI S =∑              ( 3 . 3 )  
To emphasize the role of those indicators that are more effective in predicting crises there is a second 









=∑              ( 3 . 4 )  
Where  i r  is the noise to signal ratio of indicator  i. This indicators are developed in order to give more 
weight to the more reliable indicators. We will return to this ratio later.  
In the next section, we will focus on this type of early warning indicators in order to show that many 
of them didn´t issue a warning signal or sent weak signals before the collapse of Argentina´s currency 
board. 
The threshold values of the leading indicators are set by minimizing the noise to signal ratios of each 









            ( 3 . 5 )  
Berg and Patillo (1999) tested the Kaminsky (1998) indicators for eight Asian and Latin American 
countries and they found that in only 4% of the cases the probability of crisis was over 50% in a 24 
month window crisis. The period used in this estimation was May 1995 to December 1997. If they use 
instead of the 50% of probability a 25% they found that the percentage of cases rose to 25%.  
Table 4 shows the number of studies done in Kaminsky et al. (1997) for each indicator and the 
proiportion of statistical significative cases for predicting a curecny crisis. 
A last thing must be remarked before starting the calculations of the indicators for Argentina, It is 
strongly recommendable to difference between in-sample experiments (using all data that was 
available at the time of the crisis or months before it develops) and out-sample experiments which use 
data that was not available at the time of the crisis (this is an ex-post experiment that is useful only to 
determine which are the indicators that showed an abnormal behavior in the developing of the crises). 
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Table 4: Statistically Significant Indicators in Kaminsky et al. (1997) 
Sector  Indicator  Number of studies  Statistically 
significant cases 
% of statistically 
significant cases 
International Reserves  12 11  91.7% 
M2/Int. Reserves  3 3  100% 
Credit Growth  7 5  71.4% 
Central bank credit to 
banks 
1 1  100% 
Real Exchange Rate  14 12  85.7% 
Monetary Sector 
Real interest Rate  1 1  100% 
Public sector deficit  5 3  60%  Fiscal Sector 
Credit to Public Sector  3 3  100% 
Real GDP Growth  9 5  55,6%  Macroeconomic 
Variables 
Unemployment Rate  3 2  66.7% 
Foreign interest rate  4 2  50%  Foreign variables 
Foreign GDP growth  2 1  50% 
Exports  3 2  66.7% 
Terms of Trade  3 2  66.7% 
External sector 
Trade balance  3 2  66.7% 
 
 
4- An experiment with leading indicators for Argentina 
Trying to construct all the indicators that the literature offers to predict currency crises has some 
difficulties for Argentina due to the lack of information regarding some of the variables  that must be 
used. Another difficulty for long series are the changes in methodology in some official series that 
makes them not useful for comparative purposes.  We are using on this paper series starting on 1996, 
because they have been homogeneized and in order to see if they issue warning signals before the 
currency board collapse. Table 5 shows the indicators that we have chosen using availability and 
homogeneity in the series criteria.  
 
Table 5: Selected indicators for Argentina 
Type of Indicator  Indicator 
Macroeconomic Variables   Investment/GDP, Per capita GDP variation 
Financial Indicators  Int. Reserves/GDP, Int.. Reserves/Imports, Int. Reserves variations, Total 
Banking Credit/GDP, Monetary Base / GDP, Banking Credit Variation, 
M1, M1 variation, M2/Int. Reserves, Federal Reserve Interest Rate, Int. 
Reserves/Monetary Base, Public Sector Banking Credit, Total Bank    13
Deposits Variation. 
Prices  Consumer Prices Index (CPI), CPI Variation, Wholesale Prices Index 
(WPI), WPI Variation,  
Fiscal  Variables  Public Sector Interest Payments, Interest Payments / GDP,  Public 
Debt/GDP; Public Sector Deficit/GDP 
Trade  Imports variation, Exports variation, Exports/GDP, Exports/Imports, 
Trade Balance / GDP, Total Trade/GDP,  
Exchange Rates  Real Exchange Rate (CPI calculated), Real Exchange Rate Variation 
 
We have chosen two different ways to calculate the Kaminsky-Reinhardt EMP index. On the first one 
we have simply given the same weight to reserves and real exchange rate variations. On the second 
one we have established the weights as the inverse of the dispersion coefficient.  We have also set the 
crisis threshold in two standard deviations above mean in order to maximize the accuracy of the crisis 
signals. 
 



















































































































As can be seen on Figure 5 the EMP index sends an isolated signal of crisis on November 2000 before 
sending another one on April 2001. If we would have set the threshold in three standard deviations 
(as is suggested in some literature) the indicator sends the first signal in April 2001. So, the EMP index 
shows the climax of the currency crisis the period July 2001-June 2002. 
An important feature is that the threshold changes depending on which is the data that is used. We 
have used two thresholds: one is established using data from 1996-1998 and the other one is 
established using 1996-2000. Both experiments are in-sample since both used data that was available 
well before the crisis climax. Using 1996-1998 the indicator sends isolated signals on January 1996, 
April 1999, Jan 2000, November 2000 before starting sending the more evident signals from April 2001 
to June 2002. When using 1996-2000 data  the indicator sends the first crisis signal in November 2000. 
Both approaches can be considered useful to determine the moment of the crisis, since the first one has 
signaled very lightly a crisis in the first moments of Argentina´s stagnation (the April 1999 signal) and    14
the second one has signaled clearly the climax of the currency crisis. In Figure 5 the thresholds can be 
seen as a dashed line (using 1996-2000 data) and a dotted line (using 1996-1998 data).  Also, in table 6 
can be seen the differences in the tresholds of the EMP indexes. 
 
Table 6: EMP Index thresholds using different data reference 
Thresholds  EMP Index 
Using 1996-1998 mean and std. 
deviation 










EMP 1: Using 
equal weigts 









EMP 2: weighted 
by the inverse of 
std. deviation. 
0.6 0.9 0.8 1.1 
 
 
As literature suggests we can build the EMP index using weights that are the inverse of the standard 
deviation for  each variable.  The form of this index can be seen in Figure 6: 
 


















































































































This indicator sends almost the same signals as the one that we used before. The only difference is that 
in the first half of 2001 the indicator in Figure 6 sends signals in January 2001 and then stops sending 
them until August 2001. This leads us to say that the first indicator, despite being more rudimentary 
signals better the climax of the crisis.    15
A s  w e  s a i d  b e f o r e  s o m e  a u t h o r s  u s e  a n  i n d i c a t o r  o f  e x c h a n g e  m a r k e t  p r e s s u r e  t h a t  i n c l u d e s  t h e  
domestic interest rate. We will test this indicator for Argentina in section 5 but instead of using just an 
arbitrary exchange rate we will use another indicator of our own that includes the spread between 
short term and long term interest rates. This has the advantage of anticipating some of the crises 
because this spread increases in the proximity of them. 
We have evaluated the behavior of the variables chosen as leading indicators and Table 7 shows the 
main findings: 
 
Table 7: Argentina -  Indicators sending signals prior to the crisis 
Period  Number of indicators sending 
signals 
% over total indicators 
January-June 1998  5  17.2% 
July-December 1998  2  6.9% 
January-June 1999  7  24.1% 
July-December 1999  3  10.3% 
January-June 2000  7  24.1% 
July-December 2000  7  24.1% 
January-June 2001  11  37.9% 
July-December 2001  12  41.4% 
January-June 2002  13  44.8% 
July-December 2002  13  44.8% 
Average 1998-2000  5  17.8% 
 
As we can see, even in the worst period of the crisis there is less of 45% of indicators sending the 
apropriate signals. The average of signals in the two years before the crisis is of 17.8% of the indicators 
sending the correct signals. The noise to signal ratios are high, specially because the indicators have 
not send warning signals when the EMP indexes shjow the existence of problems. 
As we said before, one of the main drawbacks of the leading indicators appro ach to Argentina´s 
currency crisis is that the calculation of the mean is strongly influenced by the period that the 
researcher is considering. We have chosen to use as mean a period considered of normality, for 
example calculating the mean of the period 1996-2000. But the thresholds change dramatically if 
another sample is taken (this can be fully observed in Annex I where we have taken two thresholds, 
one calculated with 1996-2000 mean and another one calculated with 1996-1998 means). Thresholds, 
means and variances using different datasets can be found in Annex I and II. In Annex III the 
evolution of some leading indicators considered through some graphical analysis can be seen.    16
 
5- A proposal for new indicators for Argentina 
Some proposals for new indicators can be done in two levels: first of all on the EMP index where it can 
be suggested to include some fundamental variables. On second level we can propose some new 
indicators that can anticipate a little bit better the climax of the crisis. 
 
Proposals for the EMP index 
Indicators of Exchange Market Pressure 
In previous section we analyzed the EMP indexes proposed by Kaminsky-Reinhart with an 
application to Argentina. Now we can add some interesting variables to the analysis in order to see if 
they signal the existence of an incubating crisi in a better way. One way to do this could be adding to 
the EMP index an exchange rate. The choice of with which exchange rate to work is somewhat 
arbitrary, so we have chosen instead to use a spread between same term credit nominated in domestic 
and foreign currency. 
A good way to see if this will have a better result is to analyze separately the new variable as if it were 
an EMP index by itself. As can be seen in Figure 7 the interest rate spread between mid term deposits 
nominated in pesos and equal term deposits nominated in dollars in the Argentinean financial system 
starts sending some warning  signals in March 2001 (if we choose the threshold of three standard 
deviations above mean). The threshold is represented in the graphic as the dotted line. If we had 
chosen the threshold of two standard deviations this indicator would have sent one warning signal in 
November 2000. 
 
Figure 7 – Argentina – Spread between Argentinean Peso and U.S. Dollar nominated deposits in 




























































































































We can elaborate an indicator of EMP containing this spread. The use of this new variable in the EMP 
index is adviced because in countries like Argentina, interest rates in domestic currency are 
considerably higher than in dollars, because for the financial system it is more difficult to atract this 
type of deposits due to previous experiences of devaluation and depreciation of the domestic 
currency.    17
3, 1 2 3 Re tt t I w RER w Spread w s =∆ + −∆          ( 5 . 1 )  
We have chosen to use equal weights for each variable by following the experience obtained with the 
Kaminsky-Reinhart indexes in the previous section. In equation (5.1) the weights  1 w , 2 w  and  3 w  are 
set equal to 0.333 each. 
As can be seen in Figure 8 this index sends a crisis signal in November 2000 and starts sending signals 
again in March 2001. This is quite similar to the results obtained with the original Kaminsky-Reinhart 
EMP index with equal weight. 
 















































































































Then we can set another indicator of EMP containing at the same time the interest rate (as sugested by 
Eichengreen et al.) and the spread. 
  4, 1 2 3 4 Re tt t t I w RER w Spread w i w s =∆ + +∆ −         ( 5 . 2 )  
Again we have chosen to set the weights equal for each variable. So, in (5.2)  1 w , 2 w ,  3 w  and  4 w  are set 
equal to 0.25 each. 
With a threshold of two standard deviations we obtain here the same results than with the previous 
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If we experiment in constucting the index using the weights as the inverse of the standard deviation, 




.. . R e tt t
RER Spread s
I RER Spread s
σσ σ




Re tt t t
RER Spread i s
I RER Spread i s
σσ σ σ
=∆+ + ∆ −        ( 5 . 4 )  
we have used the standard deviations of period 1996-2000, that is a period of relative normality before 
the crisis climax. 
The evolution of this two indexes can be seen in Figure 10. 
 
Figure 10 – EMP Indexes weighted by the inverse of the standard deviation 
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Index 5 (I5) gives a signal in July 1999, then an isolated one in November 2000 and then starts sending  
signals from March 2001 up to November 2003 (except for the three months of the crisis climax , 
December 2001- February 2002). 
Index 6 (I6) sends the first signal in July 1999 and also gives the same signals  than I5, being its 
evolution extremely similar to the one of that index. 
We have also used as a weight for the EMP index the inverse of the variances as is suggested by 




.. . R e tt t
RER Spread s
I RER Spread s
σσ σ
=∆ + −∆         ( 5 . 5 )  
6, 22 2 2
Re
111 1
.. . R e tt t t
RER Spread i s
I RER Spread i s
σσ σ σ
=∆ + + ∆ −        ( 5 . 6 )  
 
As can be seen on Figure 11, Index 7 (I7) sends the first signal on June 1999 and then all the signals 
that have been sent by indexes I5 and I6. Index 8 (I8) has the same pattern.  
 




Results change using  mean, standard deviations and variances from the period 1996-1998, giving 
more often signals of crisis. 
A conclusion that can be obtained from the analysisi of this EMP indexes is that most of the time the 2 
standard deviations threshold is somewhat high making the EMP not send enough signals of crisis in 
the moments when it should have done so. An option to solve this is to reduce the threshold to 1.75 
standard deviations. This gives more sensibility to the indexes making them signal the crisis some 
months before. Other option could be to use mean and standard deviation of periods of normality 
(understanding “normality” as the value that this parameters take in a period of growth). This 
thresholds should be calibrated in order to reflect the particularities of each economy in developing 
countries.  
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Some useful indicators 
Since some of the commonly used indicators failed in sending warning signals when Argetina´s crisis 
was unleashed we want to propose some indicators that can represent certain particularities of the 
Argentinean economy. 
Table 8: Argentina - Chosen  leading indicators 
Type of Indicator  Indicators 
Fiscal Indicators  Interest  Payments/Tax  Revenues,  Current 
Expenditures/Tax Revenues,  Current 
Expenditures/Lagged Tax Revenues 
Financial Indicators  Credits/Deposits,  Variation of Private Capitals 
in Balance of Payments  
Exchange Rate indicators  Departure of Real Exchange Rate from Trend 
 
On table 8 can be seen the indicators that we have chosen. Some of them reflect certain intrinsec 
characteristics of Argettina´s situation before the crisis. The Interest Payments over Tax Revenues 
indicator was selected because it reflected if the authorities were able to pay all the interests with the 
revenue of each specific month. In a similar way, the Current Expenditures over Tax Revenues 
indicatorr shows if the public sector is capable of financing this type of expenditures with the 
revenues of the same month. Current Expenditures over Lagged Tax Revenues shows if the public 
sector can finance its current expenditure with the revenue of the previous month (we have lagged 
only one month). The credits / deposits indicator shows if the banking system is in a healthy situation 
or if it is suffering from low deposits or excesive credit creation. The Variation of Private Capitals in 
Balance of Payments can show if there is a huge outflow of capitals, as happened to Argentina during 
the Mexican crisis or after the Russian and Brazilian ones. The departure of Real Exchange Rate from 
Trend indicator shows if there is volatility on the exchange market that could lead to collapse. Annex 
IV shows the mean and thresholds for the new set of leading indicators both using 1996-1998 and 
1996-2000 data. Annex V is the graphical analysisi of this indicators where can be seen the results in a 
more explicit way. 
In Table 9 we ahow the number of signals that is issuing each indicator using thresholds at 1.75 and 2  
standard deviarions, with 1996-1998 and 1996-2000 data: 
 
Table 9: Number of signals sent by each proposed indicator 
Indicator    1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003 
A*  3 0 0 0 12 12 10  12 
B*  1 0 0 0 12 10 10  12 
C*  1 0 0 0 5  7 10  11 
Credits/Deposits 
D*  0 0 0 0 1  5 10  11 
A*  1 1 0 1 1  2  1 8 
B*  1 0 0 0 1  2  1 8 
Tax Revenues / GDP 
C*  1 0 0 0 1  2  1 8    21
D*  1 0 0 0 1  2  1 8 
A*  0 1 2 2 3  7  3 1 
B*  0 0 1 2 3  6  3 1 
C*  0 0 0 2 2  3  0 0 
Interest Payments / 
Tax Revenues 
D*  0 0 0 1 2  3  0 0 
A*  0 1 0 4 4  5  2 0 
B*  0 0 0 4 2  5  2 0 
C*  0 0 0 2 2  2  1 0 
Current Expenditures 
/ Tax Revenues 
D*  0 0 0 1 2  1  1 0 
A*  1 0 0 1 2  3  3 0 
B*  0 0 0 1 1  3  3 0 
C*  0 0 0 1 1  3  3 0 
Current 
Expenditures/ Tax 
Revenues in t-1 
D*  0 0 0 0 0  1  3 0 
A*  0 1 2 2 3  6  3 2 
B*  0 0 0 2 3  4  3 1 
C*  0 0 0 1 2  2  3 1 
Interest Payments / 
Current Expenditures 
D*  0 0 0 0 1  2  1 0 
A*  0 0 0 0 2  2  4 4 
B*  0 0 0 0 2  2  4 2 
C*  0 0 0 0 1  2  4 1 
Private Capital Flows 
Variation (quarterly 
variable) 
D*  0 0 0 0 1  2  4 0 
A*  2 0 0 1 7 12 12  8 
B*  0 0 0 0 6 12 12  7 
C*  0 0 0 0 4 12 12  4 
Departure of Real 
Exchange Rate from 
Trend 
D*  0 0 0 0 3 12 12  3 
A*  1 1 2 8 5  9 11  12 
B*  1 1 2 8 4  9 11  12 
C*  0 0 0 3 1  9 10  11 
Interest Rates Spread 
D*  0 0 0 0 1  9 10  11 
* A = using 1996-1998 mean and std. dev. – Threshold set at 1.75 std.deviation. 
   B = using 1996-1998 mean and std. dev. – Threshold set at 2 std.deviation. 
   C = using 1996-2000 mean and std. dev. – Threshold set at 1.75 std.deviation. 
   D = using 1996-2000 mean and std. dev. – Threshold set at 2 std.deviation.    22
 
The Credits/Deposits anticipates airly well the crisis giving 12 signals in 2000 and 2001 when 1996-
1998 data is used. It also keeps sending signals when the worst of the crisis is over. This later feature is 
due to the “asymmetric pesification” system implemented in the first months of 2002 and the 
“corralito bancario” that was desarticulated only in 2003. If 1996-2000 data is used with the 1.75 
standard deviation the indicator works in a similar way sending 5 signals in 2000, 7 in 2001, 10 in 2002 
and 11 in 2003. 
The Tax Revenues over GDP indicator does not perform so well, sending only few signals in the 
moment of the crisis climax. This could be explained by the stationality characteristics of tax collection 
where some taxes are collected in certain months and not in others. 
The Interest Payments over Tax Revenues performs well, specially using 1996-1998 mean and 
standard deviation. As can be seen on Table 9 the indicator sends 3 signals in 2000, 7 in 2001, 3 in 2002 
and 1 in 2003. The diminishing of signals in 2002 and 2003 can be explained by the default of public 
debt at the end of 2001. 
The Current Expenditures over Tax Revenues also performs better with 1996-1998 mean and 
deviations. It starts sending signals in 1999 and 2000. In 2001 the number of signals  increases and in 
2002 diminishes, dissapearing in 2003. This is mostly explained by the increase in revenues in 2002 
due to inflation and the implementation of the export taxes that ahd also effect in the tax revenues of 
2003. A similar analysis can be done for the Current Expenditures over Tax Revenues in t-1. Both 
indicators does not perform as well if 1996-2000 data is used. 
Interest Payments over Current Expenditures performs better with 1996-1998 data where in 1999 are 
issued 2 signals, in 2000 are issued 3 signals and in 2001 are issued 6. In 2002 three signals are issued 
and this can be explained by the default of the public debt at the end of December 2001. 
Private Capital Flows Variation has the drawback of being a quarterly variable but the outflow of 
capital had an important role in the Argetinean crisis. This indicator can send a maximum of 4 signals 
per year and beginning in 2000 sends 2 signals per year until the economy collapses, sending 4 signals 
in 2002, a year when the retirement of capitals increased. 
Departure of Real Exchange Rate from Trend also performs well, giving good signals in 2000 and even 
more in 2001 and 2002. 
Finally, the Interest Rates Spread has a good performance, increasing deeply as the crisis approaches. 
Two of the three months of 2001 where the indicator did not send signals can be explained as the first 
two months of the restriction to withdrawal of deposits (November and December 2001) 
The noise-to-signal ratios of most of this indicator are lower than for the ones analysed in the previous 
section. 
This indicators feature certain particularities of Argetinean economies that can also appear in certain 
developing countries, specially the ones in Latin America. So, this indicators proposed can be a 
starting point for a wider Early Warning System to predict this type of crises. 
 
 
6- Conclusions and Extensions 
The possibility of forecasting a currency crisis with enough anticipation is extremely relevant for 
developing countries longing to achieve a development path. The leading indicators approach is an 
interesting and relative new approach that deserves still a lot of research. The availability of all the    23
data used to elaborate this indicators can be very useful for policy makers that are willing to forecast 
the existence of currency crises. It is really necessary for developing countries to have a tool that 
allows them to forecast the probability of occurrence of a crisis within a time window wide enough to 
let them react in order to avoid this problematic situation. Indicators should not be exhaustive and 
should show particularities of the economy that is being studied 
Also, a good path to explore is which year or period to take as a basis for analysis. That is, which 
period must be the meand and deviations referred too. As was seen in the previous section this could 
take to different results. 
There is still a lot of work to develop on leading indicators of currency crisis. Some of our proposals 
for further exploration is to work with seasonally adjusted indicators in order to differenciate the 
variations due to the crisis of those thata re derived merely from seasonal variations. Also another 
proposal could be to analyze the departure of indicators its trend. One way to explore this could be 
using a Hodrick-Prescott filter to determine the trend and then to analyze the departures from it for 
each variable. 
Another extension could be the use of multi-country models where contagion is taken on account and 
where fundamentals from the main trading partners can be analyzed in a similar way. 
There are multiple crisis with particular features, such as the one suffered by Argentina in 2001-2002. 
this type of crisis need a deep analysis and a permanent following of multiple key variables. This 
consideration of multiple factors (macroeconomic, political, financial) is essential to construct an 
effective Early Warning System because indicators that could be good in predicting some currencies 
could not be as good in explaining others.  
A drawback of the leading approach indicators is that it only matters if the indicator is above or below 
the critical threshold, but it does not matter how far have this threshold been surpased. It is just the 
same for this type of models to surpass the critical value in 1% than in 10%. A further work can be 
done in order to give more weight to values that surpass the threshold in a bigger magnitude. 
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ANNEX I - Mean and Variance of  selected leading indicators 
1996-2001 1996-1998 1999-2000 2001-2002 2003-2004  Indicator 
Mean Var Mean Var Mean Var Mean Var Mean Var 
Int. Reserves/GDP 
(in %) 
10.3 2.51  9.4  1.53 11.7 0.16 10.4 2.42 10.2 2.34 
Imports Variation 
(in %) 
-0.3 97.5 1.14  82.66 0.2  73.1 -2.8 247.5 5.1  104.1 
Int. 
Reserves/Imports 
13.7 7.18 11.5 1.41 15.8 1.47 15.5 10.7  9.9  1.44 
Int. Reserves 
Variation in pesos 
(in %) 
0.1 19.3 1.5 4.37  0  4.4 0.9 102 2.1 30.5 
Int. Reserves in 
dollars – variation 
(in %) 
0.1 19 1.5  4.45 0  4.4  -4 104.4  2.8 34.6 
Exports variation 
(in%) 
0.9 108.4 1.3 106.6 1.4 116.6 -0.5  70.4  2.2  60.5 
Exports/GDP (in%)  0.7  0.0064  0.74  0.0053 0.7 0.0060 1.5  0.548  1.9  0.024 
Exports/Imports  1.01 0.0511 0.91  0.012 0.98 0.014 2.12  0.7  1.89 0.177 
Total Credits / 
GDP (in %) 
27.1 7.97 24.9 4.09 29.7 1.41  29  54.57 15.8 6.51 
Monetary 
Base/GDP (in %) 
4.9 0.12 4.8 0.09 5.1 0.11 6 1.48  10.2  1.35 
Credits Variation 
(in %) 




-0.01  0.019  -0.1  0.009 0 0.007  0.3  0.025  0.3  0.006 
Real Exchange Rate 
(CPI) 
81.8 52.8 88.4 15.8 75.7  2.5  126.5 3077.1 175.9  21.0 
Real Exchange Rate 
(CPI) Variation (in 
%) 
-0.2 2.97 -0.2 1.27 -0.5 4.87 4.4  148.08  0.1  3.81 
M1 (in pesos)  24977  5520291  24646  6237074 26365  650760  27016 19047302 52266  102697346 
M1 Variation (in %)  0.3  29.9  1  16.4 -0.1 18.6 1.3  69.0  2.9  5.7 






0.2  0.0123  0.2%  0.0057 0.3  0.01  0.2 0.0199 0.1 0.0084 
Consumer Prices 
Index Variation (in 
%) 
0 0.11 0 
 
0.08 -0.1 0.12 1.4  5.84  0.4  0.13 
Wholesale Prices 
Index Variation (in 
%) 
-0.1 0.46 -0.2 0.39  0.2  0.55 3.2 34.07 0.4 0.87 
M2/Int. reserves  1.3  0.017  1.3  0.007 1.2 0.001 1.4 0.058 1.6 0.016 




2.1 0.07 2.0 0.04 2.3 0.01 1.8 0.12  1  0.01 
Total Trade / GDP 
(in %) 
1.5 0.02 1.6 0.02 1.5 0.01 2.2 0.70 3.0 0.09 
Deposits Variation 
(in %) 
0.3  4.90  1.2  2.79 0 0.65  -0.8  12.39  2.1  2.60 
Credits/Deposits  1 0.00133 1 0.000256 1 0.000893  1.1 0.05752 0.7  0.0184    28
ANNEX II - Threshold values for selected leading indicators 
Thresholds Using 1996-1998 
data* 
Thresholds Using 1996-2000 
data* 




















9.4  10.33  I: 7.21  I:6.9  I: 5.6  I: 7.7  I:7.3  I: 5.8 
Imports Variation (in 
%) 



























Variation in pesos (in 
%) 
1.5  0.89  I: -2.2  I: -2.7  I: -4.8  I: -2.2  I: -3.6  I: -5.8 
Int. Reserves in 
dollars – variation (in 
%) 
1.5  1.0  I: -2.3  I: -2.84  I:-4.98  I: -3.06  I: -3.62  I: -5.86 
Exports variation (in 
%) 
1.3  1.38  I: -17  I: 19.62  I: -30.1 I:-17.19  I:-19.84 I:  -30.46 
Exports/GDP (in %)  0.74  0.73  I: 0.61  I: 0.59  I: 0.51  I: 0.6  I: 0.58  I: 0.51 












Total Credits / GDP 
(in %) 


























Credits Variation (in 
%) 


























Real Exchange Rate 
(CPI) (index 
1991=100) 












Real Exchange Rate 
(CPI) Variation (in %) 











I: -5.32    29

























Payments (in pesos) 














0.16  0.2  S: 0.3  S: 0.32  S:0.39  S: 0.37  S: 0.40  S:0.50 
Consumer Prices 
Index Variation (in 
%) 













Index Variation (in 
%) 







































2.0  2.1  I: 1.6  I: 1.57  I:1.37  I: 1.68  I: 1.62  I: 1.39 
Total Trade / GDP 
(in %) 














1.2  0.75  I: -1.73  I: -2.16  I:-3.85  I: -1.91  I: -2.29  I: -3.81 
* S = upper threshold, I= lower threshold    30
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ANNEX IV  - Means  and thresholds of proposed leading indicators 
With 1996-1998 data*  With 1996-2000 data* 









2 std. dev  3 std. dev 
Credits/ 
Deposits 












Tax Revenues / GDP 
(in %) 













Tax Revenues (in %) 













/ Tax Revenues 
1.13  S: 1.26  S: 1.27  S: 1.34  1.17  S: 1.34  S: 1.37  S: 1.47 
Current Expenditures 
/ Tax Revenues in  
t-1 
1.14  S: 1.36  S: 1.39  S: 1.51  1.17  S: 1.39  S: 1.42  S: 1.55 
Interest Payments / 
Current Expenditures 
(in %) 
10.5  S: 18.6  S: 19.8  S: 24.4  12.2  S: 21.4  S: 22.7  S: 28 
Private Capital Flows 
Variation (in millions 
of USD) 
1535  I: -809  I: -1144  I: -2485  1033  I: -1740  I: -2136  I: -3721 
Balance of Payments 
(in millions of USD) 
1042  I:-1644  I:-2027 I:-3563 688  I:-1998  I:-2381 I:-3917 
Departure of Real 
Exchange Rate from 
Trend 






0.3 S:  9.1 




I: - 14.6 
Interest Rates Spread  1.36  S: 2.26  S: 2.39  S: 2.90  1.85  S: 3.48  S: 3.71  S: 4.64 
* S = upper threshold, I= lower threshold    34


































































































                             1.75 std. dev
                              2 std. dev
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